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Enhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks.
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We study the effect of clustering on the organization of cooperation, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on scale-free networks with a tunable value of clustering. We find that a high value of
the clustering coefficient produces an overall enhancement of cooperation in the network, even for a very high
temptation to defect. On the other hand, high clustering homogeneizes the process of invasion of degree classes
by defectors, decreasing the chances of survival of low densities of cooperator strategists in the network.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le, 89.75.Fb
Cooperative phenomena are essential in natural and human
systems and have been the subject of intense research during
decades [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Evolutionary game theory is con-
cerned with systems of replicating agents programmed to use
some strategy in their interactions with other agents, which
ultimately yields a feedback loop that drives the evolution
of the strategies composition of the population [6, 7, 8]. To
understand the observed survival of cooperation among un-
related individuals in populations when selfish actions pro-
vide a short-term higher benefit, a lot of attention has been
paid to the analysis of evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game. In this simple two-players game, indi-
viduals adopt one of the two available strategies, cooperation
(C) or defection (D); both receiveR under mutual cooperation
and P under mutual defection, while a cooperator receives
S when confronted to a defector, which in turn receives T ,
where T > R > P > S. Under these conditions in a one-shot
game it is better to defect, regardless of the opponent strategy,
and the proportion of cooperators asymptotically vanishes in
a well-mixed population. On the other hand, the structure of
interactions among individuals in real societies are seen to be
described by complex networks of contacts rather than by a
set of agents connected all-to-all [9, 10]. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to abandon the panmixia hypothesis to study how co-
operative behavior appear in the social context.
Several studies [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] have
reported the asymptotic survival of cooperation on different
kinds of networks. Notably, cooperation even dominates over
defection in non-homogeneous, scale-free (SF) networks, i.e.
in graphs where the number k of neighbors of an individ-
ual (the node degree) is distributed as a power law [12, 15],
P (k) ∼ k−γ , with 2 < γ ≤ 3. Networks with such a dis-
tribution are ubiquitous: scale-free topologies appear as the
backbone of many social, biological, technological complex
systems. However, in the context of social systems, other
topological features, such as the presence of degree-degree
correlations and of high clustering coefficients, are relevant
ingredients to take into account in a complete description of
the networks. The studies of the PD game on SF networks
have considered so far networks with no degree correlations
and nearly zero clustering coefficient, with the remarkable ex-
ception of Ref. [20] where high clustering SF networks are
studied. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the effects that
structural properties such as clustering and degre-degree cor-
relations have on the survival of cooperation in complex net-
woks.
In this paper, we focus on the effects that the presence of
non vanishing clustering coefficient have on the survival of
cooperation. The clustering coefficient of a network is related
to the number of triangles present in the network, and is de-
fined as the probability that two neighbors of a given node
share also a connection between them [9, 10]. A high clus-
tering coefficient points out the presence of local neighbor-
hoods, i.e. small clusters of densely interconnected nodes, in
the network. This property is present in most of social net-
works where two friends of an individual are also friends with
high probability. Therefore a full description of cooperative
phenomena in social networks should be tackled by consider-
ing highly clustered scale-free networks.
Network model.- We study a class of SF networks with a
tunable clustering coefficient introduced by Holme and Kim
(HK) in Ref. [21]. The networks are constructed via a grow-
ing process that starts from an initial core of m0 unconnected
nodes. At each time step, a new node i (i = m0 + 1, ..., N )
is added to the network and links to m (with m ≤ m0) of the
previously existent nodes. The first link follows a preferential
attachment rule (PA), i.e. the probability that node i attaches
to a node j of the network (with j < i) is proportional to the
degree kj of the node j. The remaining m − 1 links are at-
tached in two different ways: (i) with probability p the new
node i is connected to a randomly chosen neighbor of node j;
(ii) with probability (1−p) the PA rule is used again, and node
i is connected to another one of the previously existent nodes.
With such a procedure one obtains SF networks with degree
distribution P (k) ∼ k−3, and a tunable clustering coefficient
depending on the value of p. In particular, for p = 0 we
recover the Baraba´si-Albert model [22] where the clustering
coeffienct tends to zero as the network size N goes to infinity.
For values of p > 0 the clustering coefficient monotonously
grows with p [21].
We have first checked that the networks produced by the
HK model have no degree-degree correlations, and we have
2analyzed the dependence of the node clustering coefficient on
the node degree. The clustering coefficient of a node i, CCi,
expresses how likely ajm = 1 for two neighbors j and m of
node i, where A = {aij} is the adjacency matrix of the graph.
The value of CCi is obtained by counting the actual number
of edges, denoted by ei, in Gi, the subgraph of neighbors of i.
The clustering coefficient of i is defined as the ratio between
ei and ki(ki − 1)/2, the maximum possible number of edges
in Gi [9, 10]:
CCi =
2ei
ki(ki − 1) =
∑
j,m aijajmami
ki(ki − 1) . (1)
The mean clustering coefficient of the graph, CC, is then
given by the average of CCi over all the nodes in the network.
By definition, 0 ≤ CCi ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ CC ≤ 1. In Fig. 1 we
report the results obtained for networks with m = m0 = 3
and N = 5 · 103. We have considered different values of
p corresponding to networks with mean clustering coefficient
CC = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.33, 0.46 and 0.65. Ensembles of 2 · 104
networks have been generated for each value of p. In Fig. 1.a
we plot, as a function of k, the average degree Knn(k) of
the neighbors of nodes with degree k. The figure shows a
nearly constant function Knn(k), pointing out that the HK
model produces SF networks with no degree-degree correla-
tions. This result is further confirmed by computing the as-
sortative index r, introduced in Ref. [23], as a punction of
the networks’ CC. As observed from Fig. 1.b the values of
r are close to 0 for all values of the CC, thus confirming the
absence of degree-degree correlations in all the studied net-
works. On the other hand, Fig. 1.c reveals that the average
clustering coefficient CC(k) of nodes with degree k, strongly
depends on k. In particular we observe a power law decay
CC(k) ∼ k−α for high values of the mean clustering coeffi-
cient of the network. Therefore, all the networks used in this
work have the same degree distribution and no degree-degree
correlations and thus they allow us to make a correct estimate
of the role of the clustering coefficient on the promotion of
cooperation in SF networks.
Evolutionary Dynamics.- We now assume that each node of
the graph represents a player. A link between two nodes of the
graph indicates that the two players interact and can play. We
implement the finite population analogue of replicator dynam-
ics [12, 15] for the PD game with payoffsR = 1, P = S = 0,
and T = b > 1. At each generation, of the discrete evolu-
tionary time, t, each agent i plays once with every agent in
its neighborhood and accumulates the obtained payoffs, Pi.
Then all the players update synchronously their strategies by
the following rules. Each individual i chooses at random a
neighbor, j, and compares its payoff Pi with Pj . If Pi ≥ Pj ,
player i keeps the same strategy for the next generation. On
the other hand, if Pj > Pi, the player i adopts the strategy
of its neighbor j with probability Πi→j = β(Pj − Pi), for
the next game round robin. Here, β is related to the charac-
teristic inverse time scale: the larger β, the faster evolution
takes place. We assume β = (max{ki, kj}b)−1. This choice
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FIG. 1: (Color online). (a) Average degree of the neighbors of nodes
with degree k, Knn(k), for four SF networks with different values
of the CC. (b) Assortative index , r, as a function of the CC of the
networks. Both measures, Knn(k) and r, reveal that SF networks
generated from the HK model show no degree-degree correlations.
(c) Mean clustering coefficient of nodes with degree k, CC(k), for
four SF networks with different CC. From this figure it is clear a
power law decay, CC(k) ∼ k−α, for highly clustered networks.
assures that Πi→j < 1 and also slows down the invasion pro-
cess from or to highly connected nodes [12].
After a transient time, the evolutionary dynamics reaches a
stationary regime which can be characterized by the average
cooperation index 〈c〉, defined as the overall fraction of time
spent by all the players in the cooperator state. The value of
〈c〉 is computed as follows. After a transient time τ0 = 5 ·103,
we further evolve the system over time windows of τ = 103
generations each, and we study the time evolution of the num-
ber of cooperators, c(t). In each time window we compute the
average value and the fluctuations of c(t). When the fluctua-
tions are less or equal to 1/
√
N , we stop the simulation and
we consider the average cooperation obtained in the last time
window, as the asymptotic average cooperation 〈c〉 of the re-
alization. In each realization we change both the network and
the initial conditions of the dynamics. All the results reported
below are averages over 103 realizations for each value of the
network and game parameters (p and b respectively).
Results.- To unveil the influence that clustering has on the
promotion of cooperation in scale-free networks, we explore
the evolutionary dynamics on networks with different values
of the clustering coefficient. In Fig. 2 we report 〈c〉 as a func-
tion of b. As expected, the degree of cooperation 〈c〉 decreases
monotonously as the temptation to defect b increases. How-
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FIG. 2: Average degree of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function of the temp-
tation to defect b. The six different curves show the transition from
all-cooperator to all-defector states for SF networks with different
average clustering coefficient. On the one hand, the cooperation is
enhanced as the clustering coefficient increases. On the other hand,
the transition to all-defector networks is smoother when clustering is
smaller.
ever, the path from an all-cooperator network, at b = 1, to an
all-defector network, for high values of b, depends strongly on
the clustering coefficient of the SF network. From the figure
it is clear that SF networks with the highest clustering coef-
ficient show a remarkable survival of cooperation with val-
ues 〈c〉 ≃ 1 up to temptation values of b = 2, in agreement
with [20]. This is in contrast with the constant decrease of
the cooperation observed in networks with no clustering. On
the other hand, the enhancement of cooperation for clustered
SF networks disappears when moving to higher values of b.
In particular, a sharp decrease from high to zero cooperation
is observed when b varies in the narrow range b ∈ (2, 2.5),
with SF networks with small custering coefficients showing a
slower convergence to the all-defector state.
Since all the networks analyzed share the same degree dis-
tribution, it is possible to compare the microscopic evolution
of cooperation as a function of b by looking at the probability,
Pc(k), that a node of degree k acts as cooperator in the station-
ary regime. Such a probability is calculated by considering the
final time configurations for each value of b and p. Namely,
for a given realization l (of the network and of the initial con-
ditions), we measure the final number cl(k) of cooperators of
degree k, and the number of nodes nl(k) of degree k. Then,
Pc(k) is computed as Pc(k) =
∑
l cl(k)/
∑
l nl(k).
In Fig. 3 we report Pc(k) for different values of the temp-
tation, b, and for two SF networks corresponding to the low-
est and highest values of the CC. As b increases, and hence
the average cooperation 〈c〉 decreases, the curves Pc(k) show
the same behavior in the two networks considered. In par-
ticular, high degree nodes are more resistant to defection and
display the highest values of Pc(k), for each value of b. In ad-
dition to this, the profile of Pc(k) shows, for all the curves, a
well defined global minimum for intermediate degree classes.
Therefore, low connected nodes are not the easiest ones to
be invaded by defectors. This result has been previously re-
ported for BA networks in [24]. In BA networks the existence
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FIG. 3: Probability Pc(k) of finding a node of degree k playing as
cooperator in the stationary regime of the evolutionary dynamics.
Different curves correspond to different values of the temptation to
defect, b. The two panels correpond to two SF with different CC,
namely (a) CC = 0.0, (b) CC = 0.65.
of the minimum is explained by the presence of low degree
nodes (the last nodes to be attached in the network growth
process) that are only connected to the hubs. These leaves
are thus isolated by hubs from the rest of the network and
therefore imitate and fixate the cooperative strategy adopted
by their corresponding neighboring hubs. The same picture
applies for highly clustered networks but with an important
difference regarding the organization of leaves around hubs.
In this case, the last nodes attached to the network are usually
connected both with a hub and with other low degree nodes
(also attached to the hub). These nodes are again dynami-
cally isolated from the rest of the network by the hub and thus
they imitate and then fixate the hub’s strategy. Additionally,
the links between isolated leaves that close the triads (com-
posed of a hub and two leaves) nourish these leaves with a
new mechanism to resist defection since their payoff is now
provided both from the hubs and other leaves. Therefore, any
eventual change of the state of the hubs is not trivially fol-
lowed by a change of leaves’ state since they can still obtain
payoff from the interactions that share among them. In other
words, the density of triangles around hubs in highly clustered
SF networks enhances the fixation of cooperation in low de-
gree nodes.
Let us now focus on the path towards 〈c〉 = 0 as b increases.
Although the overall picture revealed from Fig. 3 seems to be
qualitatively the same regardless the CC of the networks, a
careful inspection of the results reveals that a high CC tends
to homogenize the role of degree classes when defectors in-
vade the network. In Fig. 4 we have plotted again the proba-
bility Pc(k) for several SF networks of different CC. In each
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FIG. 4: ProbabilityPc(k) of finding a node of degree k playing as co-
operator in the stationary regime of the evolutionary dynamics. Each
panel shows Pc(k) for networks with different CC and the same av-
erage level of cooperation: (a) 〈c〉 = 0.35, (b) 〈c〉 = 0.05. Note that
in each panel the curves Pc(k) correspond to different values of the
temptation to defect, b, for each network.
panel of the figure we have plotted the curves Pc(k) of several
networks at different temptation values, b, so that the aver-
age level of cooperation, 〈c〉, is the same in all the networks.
Namely, Figs. 4.a and 4.b correspond to 〈c〉 ≃ 0.35 and 0.05
respectively. For low clustering networks the shape of Pc(k)
can be naively described by defining a quantity k∗(b), so that
for k > k∗(b) we have Pc(k) ≃ 1, while Pc(k) ≪ 1 for
k < k∗(b). This description has been already introduced in
[24] for BA networks. Obviously, the value k∗(b) grows with
b (see Fig.3.a) and hence the conversion of cooperator into de-
fector strategies can be explained as a progressive invasion of
the degree classes by defectors: the larger the value of b the
more degree hierarchies defectors have invaded. This evolu-
tion points out a smooth transition towards 〈c〉 = 0 for SF
networks with low CC values, as reported in Fig. 2. Con-
versely, for highly clustered SF networks there is not such
critical threshold k∗(b) and the invasion by defectors affects
homogeneously the degree classes. This is clear from Figs.
4.a and 4.b by looking at the curves Pc(k) corresponding to
SF networks with CC = 0.65. In these two curves, corre-
sponding to 〈c〉 = 0.35 and 0.05, all the degree classes have
been already affected by the invasion of defectors. Therefore,
one cannot describe the path towards 〈c〉 = 0 in highly clus-
tered SF networks as a hierarchical invasion of defectors such
as in the BA case [24]. On the contrary, the degree hierarchy
seems not to play a crucial role as soon as defectors invade
highly clustered networks. This result would explain the sud-
den drop of cooperation reported in Fig. 2 for high values of
CC as a consequence of the low ability of clustered networks
to bias defector strategies towards low and intermediate de-
gree classes.
Conclusions.- We have studied the role of clustering, a typ-
ical property of social systems, in the evolution of coopera-
tion in SF networks. Our conclusion is twofold. On the one
hand, a significative enhancement of cooperation is shown
when the clustering coefficient of the network is high. This
enhancement is manifested by the persistence of a population
of (nearly) all cooperators in the network even for large values
of the temptation to defect. On the other hand, the transition
to zero level of cooperation becomes sharper as the clustering
of the network increases. The sudden drop of the cooperation
in highly clustered populations is explained as a consequence
of the spreading of defector strategies across all the degree
classes. Therefore, the picture of a hierarchical invasion of
defectors previously observed in BA networks does not apply
for highly clustered SF networks.
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